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INSTITUTIONAL STRESS AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS:
JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES, VERTICAL NORMS, AND PRETRIAL
DISMISSALS
Daniel J. Knudsen*
This Article examines the effects of judicial emergencies on the
federal district courts. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
declares judicial emergencies when a weighted statistic of filings and
vacancy days exceeds certain thresholds. This Article presents evidence
on the relationship between emergency status in a judicial circuit and the
frequency of pretrial disposition in federal district courts within that
circuit: a federal district court is statistically more likely to dismiss a
case before trial if its corresponding circuit court is in emergency. This
evidence suggests that emergency status may affect normative
expectations between the federal district courts and the federal courts of
appeals. Federal district courts in circuits under stress appear to
increase their “gatekeeping” function by reducing the number of full
trials that they hear. The evidence presented in this Article also suggests
that the stability of vertical norms between the federal district courts and
the federal circuit courts plays an important role in the federal district
courts fulfilling their trial-like institutional role.
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal district courts, and federal district-court judges, remain an
undertheorized and understudied part of the federal judiciary. 1 One important
deficit is a lack of focus on institutional analysis. Indeed, “much of the existing
empirical work on federal district courts has failed to take account of the
institutional setting in which those judges operate.” 2 This institutional setting is
important. The federal district courts have jurisdiction over the vast majority of
claims arising under federal law. When compared with the Supreme Court in terms
of raw volume, the differences in filings are stark. The federal district courts
* © 2014 Daniel J. Knudsen. Knudsen is a 2012 graduate of Yale Law School and
clerked in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The author wishes to
thank Professor Christine Jolls for incomparable academic support, intellectual guidance,
and research advice. The author also wishes to thank Miguel de Figueiredo for helpful
conversations on statistical analysis, and much else. The views expressed in this Article are
those of the author, and any mistakes, errors or omissions are solely attributable thereto.
1
See generally Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Court DecisionMaking? 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83 (2009) (detailing the lack of scholarship in this
area).
2
Id. at 84.
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handle over 300,000 cases a year, compared to the federal circuit courts at
approximately 50,000 cases a year, and the Supreme Court at around 75 cases a
term. 3 Almost one thousand judges make up 78% of the federal judiciary and
oversee nearly 79% of cases in federal court. 4
A second important deficit that remains undertheorized and understudied is
the interactions and hierarchies between the federal district courts and the federal
circuit courts. The district courts constitute the first step in the process of
lawmaking. By shaping factual and procedural records and taking the first pass at
unsettled questions of law, the federal district courts are important determiners of
what ultimately constitutes the law.
This Article diminishes both of these research deficits and contributes to a
deeper understanding of the district courts and district-court judges by examining
the effects of institutional stress as measured by judicial emergencies, on case
outcomes. The Article finds that vertical norms, that is, institutional relationships
and understandings between the district and circuit courts, matter. Institutional
stress in the federal circuit courts results in federal district-court judges more
frequently disposing of cases on pretrial motions. This finding bolsters scholarship
suggesting that the federal district courts are fast losing their character as trial
courts. 5 This Article’s finding also suggests that the institutional relationship
between the federal district courts and the federal circuit courts may matter more
than previously thought for district court decision making and for the maintenance
of the federal judiciary as a deliberative institution.
Despite the lack of scholarly attention, the federal district courts have unique
judicial characteristics that make them important areas of study. One important
difference between appellate courts and trial courts is the institutional setting in
which they operate. Unlike justices on the Supreme Court or judges on federal
circuit courts, federal district-court judges work alone on the bench. 6 Thus, the
constraining aspect of panel effects is not present. This in turn has ramifications for
judicial accountability: panel effects can work to dampen ideological voting, while

3

See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 132 (2010). The issue of the Supreme Court’s shrinking
docket is also much discussed and analyzed. See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon,
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1219,
1276–78 (2012) (finding that an ideologically fractured court is likely to hear forty-two
fewer cases based on data from 1940 to 2008).
4
Kim, supra note 1, at 84.
5
See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District
Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745, 749 (2010) (describing a “move towards paper courts”).
6
The one exception to this is the three-judge district panel, only used nowadays in
legislative reapportionment cases. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 5 (1996) (“Behind the decline of the device is a desire to reduce
the Supreme Court’s obligatory jurisdiction.”).
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judges deciding alone face no such constraints. 7 Other scholars point to panels as
potentially polarizing. Panel effects are a complex issue, but the important point
for district courts is that they are absent. District judges may face other constraints
from colleagues, but these effects are likely more attenuated.
The second important difference between appellate courts and trial courts is
the procedural variety of federal district decision making. Federal district judges
rule multiple times in the course of a lawsuit on numerous motions that affect the
outcome. They also engage in fact finding more often than the federal circuit-court
judges. 8 These differences in judicial agency mean that the decision making
behavior of federal district-court judges is cumulative and decisions may be
influenced by previous decisions in the same case. This also means that judges
evaluate their decisions on pretrial motions and evidentiary issues in light of other
variables: relationships with repeat litigants, other judges’ decisions on preliminary
short motions and matters, and in relation to other rulings on initial issues in
disparate cases.
Lastly, the institutional signaling that federal district courts engage in is
different. 9 Of particular interest is the institutional relationship between districtcourt judges and federal circuit-court judges. 10 The stability of this institutional
7

This idea is highlighted in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 136 (2006) (“The presence of a potential
dissenter—in the form of a judge appointed by a president from another political party—
creates a possible whistleblower, who can reduce the likelihood of an incorrect or lawless
decision.”).
8
Kim, supra note 1, at 84–85 (“Too often, studies of the district courts rely on an
implicit assumption that judging at the trial court level is fundamentally the same as
judging at the appellate level . . . . [T]his approach is misguided . . . . [U]nlike in the typical
appellate case, a district judge may rule in a single case on multiple occasions and on
different types of questions, only a few of which could be dispositive but all of which
affect the case’s progress and ultimate outcome. Moreover, because many of the judge’s
actions are taken in response to motions by the parties, there is no determinate sequence in
which pretrial litigation events occur.”).
9
For an example of this signaling, see Catherine T. Struve, Power, Protocol, and
Practicality: Communications from the District Court During an Appeal, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2053 (2009) (demonstrating the circumstances, including when a district judge
injects reasoning into a ruling, that inform the circuit court of the merits of the case’s
review).
10
Studies that attempt to examine this institutional relationship include scholarship
about chief judges of the federal courts of appeals elevating federal district judges to meet
overburdened caseloads. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Distlear, Designated
Diffidence: District Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565
(2001); see also Sara C. Benesh, The Contribution of “Extra” Judges, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
301, 310–14 (2006) (finding that, for the Ninth Circuit, elevated senior judges meet or
exceed their expected workload relative to the sitting Circuit judges but that all elevated
judges are reluctant to write separate opinions or dissent from their appellate-level
colleagues).
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relationship is important both from the perspective of litigants in the federal system
and the judges themselves.
This Article examines federal district-court case outcomes through the lens of
the effects of institutional stress, using the declaration of a judicial emergency—a
function of both filings and also vacant judicial seats—as a variable capturing this
stress. From 2009 to 2010, attempts to fill vacancies to the federal judiciary
languished, and this trend continues. 11 Though the number of vacancies has since
subsided, over the course of the previous three years there were often more than
100 vacancies to the federal judiciary in a given month. 12 The Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) considers a subset of these vacant judicial
seats problematic enough to warrant the label “judicial emergency.” 13 Vacancies
have been a problem throughout the Obama administration, and given the
polarized nature of the national political discourse, are likely to remain a problem
in the future. 14
The crisis of the recent spate of judicial emergencies is, in short, a window
allowing a glimpse through institutional stress into federal district-court outcomes.
Exploiting the theory that judicial emergencies represent a form of institutional
stress for the federal courts, and exploiting the fact that these emergencies for the
first time have systematically affected the federal district courts, this Article finds
that the relationship between the federal district courts and the federal circuit
courts matters in a deeper way than previously thought. In particular, a statistical
analysis of decisions finds that a judicial emergency in a corresponding circuit
court results in more dismissals on pretrial motions. This Article also finds that this
effect is more pronounced in larger circuits. This finding paves the way for an
analysis of institutional stress that focuses on district-court judges as embedded
decision makers in a hierarchy. It suggests that, under stress, district-court judges
will work to protect the network connections and nodes along that hierarchy.
11

Dalhia Lithwick, Empty Chambers: Why the Judicial Vacancy Crisis Matters,
SLATE (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/20
10/09/empty_chambers.html [hereinafter Empty Chambers]; Dalhia Lithwick, The
Courthouse Is Closed: Even Before the Shutdown, Federal Courts Had Already Been
Crippled by the Sequester, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and
_politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/federal_courts_and_shutdown_the_sequester_had_already
_crippled_american.html [hereinafter Courthouse Is Closed] (detailing effects of judicial
vacancies with the recent federal shutdown); see also infra note 39 and accompanying text.
12
See, e.g., Current Judicial Vacancies, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourt
s.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/CurrentJudicialVacancies.aspx (last visited
Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that as of January 31, 2014, there were ninety-six total vacancies).
13
The rules for the declaration of judicial emergencies are detailed below. See infra
Part II.B.
14
Filibuster reform may increase the speed of confirmations. But to the extent that the
political process overemphasizes judges’ political decision making and under emphasizes
judges’ embedded decision making and institutional constraints, filibuster reform may not
have as strong an immediate impact.
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This Article contributes to the literature on institutional stress and judicial
decision making. Institutional stress is a nascent frame used to study courts and
case outcomes. The research presented in this Article thus provides an important
district-court companion and counterpoint to recent work on courts of appeal. In a
recent article, Professor Bert I. Huang examined the effects of institutional stress
on the tendency of the federal courts of appeals to grant deference to lower court
decisions. 15 By examining a period of expedited immigration board review—“a
surge”—Professor Huang isolated the effects of an increased caseload on the
Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit. 16 Professor Huang’s narrative is one of time
pressure: with compressed time to decide, federal appellate courts are likely to give
more deference to a lower court, especially on questions of state law. 17 Professor
Huang posits that an increasing caseload overwhelms each judge’s decision with
respect to the marginal value of spending extra time on aspects of a case, and
instead the federal appellate court judge defers to a lower court’s decision. 18
Earlier research also examined judicial emergencies and the process of
appointing judges, but none did so in the context of empirical analysis of
institutional stress. These articles mostly focused on political dynamics in
Congress as part of the nominating process. 19 This Article expands that focus. Its
findings have important implications for the role of federal district courts in a
democratic and constitutional structure. The erosion of district courts as trial
institutions, for example, erodes access to jury trials and consequently removes an
important site for deliberative democracy. Delays and backlogs harm not only
ordinary citizens but also the business community as it seeks other means to
effectively and impartially resolve contract and other business disputes. This
Article demonstrates that, under increasing institutional stress, these negative
effects are increasing.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II explores the declaration of judicial
emergencies by the AOUSC as an indicator of institutional stress. Examining three
case outcomes—remands to state courts, remands to government agencies, and
disposals on pretrial motions—this Article shows a robust statistical effect of
institutional stress on disposals of pretrial motions. Part III details the statistical
analysis and this effect. Part IV examines more carefully the idea of institutional
stress to the judiciary within the framework of institutions and economics. Part IV
then theorizes about vertical, horizontal, and chronological norms that embed
federal district-court judges and how institutional stress can affect these norms.
Part IV also highlights areas for additional research. Part V concludes by offering
insight on how an institutional theory of judicial decision making could
15

Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011). Professor
Huang also posits that judicial emergencies could be a source of institutional stress. Id. at
1115.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 1111–13, 1118–21.
19
See infra Part II.A.

192

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

complement psychological, utilitarian, and political theories of judicial decision
making. The Appendix presents more detail on the regression analysis that
confirms other statistical analyses done in the body of the paper.
II. JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONAL STRESS AND DISTRICT-COURT OUTCOMES
A. Existing Literature on Judicial Emergencies
Scholarly studies focused on judicial emergencies mostly reside in politicalscience literature. Their locus of analysis is the congressional nomination process,
which is an important part of the story. One important study linking nominations to
vacancies was a study of the expansion of the judiciary, and congressional intent in
doing so. 20 In examining issues of the expansion of the judiciary and nominations
to newly created seats in it, the study posits two reasons for expansion: political
efficiency and institutional efficiency. 21 Institutional efficiency rationales call for
judicial expansion because of concerns over the efficacy of judicial decision
making. Rising caseloads might trigger these concerns, and calls from within the
judiciary itself for reform would also employ the rhetoric of institutional efficiency
rationales. 22 These institutional concerns thereby gesture at the effects of
institutional stress internal to the federal judiciary. However, these studies do not
examine the expansion’s effect on case outcomes as a metric of institutional
efficiency.
Vacancies in particular have been studied. But there is a tendency in earlier
studies to focus on time-based outcome variables. A study regressing judicial
vacancies on case disposal time and workload in the federal courts of appeals from
1971 to 2002 finds significant effects on time to disposal of cases. The study used
a “vacancy rate” 23 measure and controls for the size of court business as measured
by number of appeals filed, expansions in the number of judgeships, and
percentage of newly commissioned judges. 24 While this finding is interesting, it is
not surprising: faced with vacancies, a given court of appeals will probably take
longer to dispose of cases simply because it takes longer to hear them. Moreover,
20

John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 435 (1996) (arguing that judicial expansion, and thus the possibility of vacant seats,
is more prevalent in periods of political alignment among the nominating House, Senate,
and President, as well as the enacting Senate and President).
21
Id. 438–39.
22
Id. at 439–44. Though, the authors note that these calls are not often heeded by
Congress. Id. at 442–43.
23
SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO
SHARE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 130 (2009). The study defines vacancy rate as “[dividing]
the number of vacant judgeship-months by total judgeship months each year (that is, the
number of authorized judgeships multiplied by twelve months) . . . .” Id.
24
Id.
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caseloads will necessarily rise because fewer judges result in more cases per judge.
Also, lawyers could be litigating strategically because of vacancies. That is, repeat
players in the courts could be filing more cases in flooded circuits in order to delay
the case even further. There are no studies on vacancies focused on the federal
district courts, mainly because, prior to the current political moment, nominations
at the district-court level had never been so heavily politicized.
These existing studies of appeals courts provide a window into how the
political process works to respond to or delay nominations in the face of vacancies.
They also focus on outcomes over time, but usually do not focus their analysis
through a frame of institutional stress, and especially do not focus on the
interactions between different levels of institutions within the federal judiciary. To
conduct this analysis, the Article now turns to a statistical treatment of the recent
spate of judicial emergencies.
B. Judicial Emergencies and Federal District Courts
Judicial emergencies, a label applied to both federal district courts and federal
courts of appeal, is an indicator of a court under stress. The AOUSC declares
judicial emergencies monthly, based on a metric composed of two measures. The
first measure is a weighted caseload statistic. The second measure is the days the
judicial seat has been vacant. The weighted caseload statistic is a measure
composed from calendar-year data, while the days of vacancy measure is
continuous. For the federal district courts, the weighted caseload statistic is
weighted filings per judgeship. The weights are assigned based on the perceived
time and effort that it takes a judge to resolve a case: for example, in the federal
district courts, student loan default cases are assigned a weight of 0.031 and patent
cases are assigned a weight of 1.9. 25 In the federal circuit courts the formula is less
complicated: pro se cases are weighted at one-third of a case with counsel,
reinstated cases are eliminated, and all other cases are weighted at one. 26 These
statistical weightings change over time to reflect the underlying realities of each
cause of action brought in federal courts. 27
The AOUSC declares a judicial emergency in any federal circuit court where
adjusted filings per panel of judges are over 700, or where any vacancy exceeds
eighteen months and adjusted filings per panel of judges are between 500 and
700. 28 The AOUSC follows a similar formula for the federal district courts. The
AOUSC declares a federal district court to be in judicial emergency if there is a
vacancy where weighted filings exceed 600 per judgeship; there is a vacancy for
25

Judicial Emergencies, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAn
dJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/JudicialEmergencies.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
26
Id.
27
The measures have gone through two substantial changes, once in 1993 and again
in 2004. Case Weights Get Update, UNITED STATES COURTS (August 2004), http://www.us
courts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/10-10-28/Case_Weights_Get_Update.aspx.
28
Judicial Emergencies, supra note 25.
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more than eighteen months where weighted filings per judgeship fall between 430
and 600; or a court has more than one authorized judgeship and only one active
judge. 29
These judicial emergencies, though ultimately only a label, signal to the
President and Congress a particular court in crisis. 30 Despite the label’s intended
external effect, there is some evidence that Congress ignores this signal in its
pattern of judicial appointment. 31 But there is reason to think this declaration is no
less an informational signal for federal judges themselves; its informational effect
is perhaps even greater. To understand this, it is necessary to understand why
exactly a judicial emergency is an emergency. Despite the notes of alarm sounded
by the press and academic commentators over the crisis in judicial appointments,32
neither judicial vacancies nor judicial emergencies are new phenomena.
But there are some unprecedented aspects of the current round of vacancies
and emergencies that create institutional stress. Senate “[c]onfirmation rates at 18
months into a presidency have fallen.” 33 In 1982, under President Ronald Reagan,
the confirmation rate was 93%, but under President Barack Obama this rate has
fallen to 47%. 34 Another unprecedented aspect of the recent judicial emergencies is
the extension of vacancies and emergencies to the federal district courts. 35 Never
before have political actors engaged in such politicking around nominations at the
federal district-court level. For example, in the Northern District of Oklahoma,
Arvo Mikkanen’s nomination by President Obama was blocked, allegedly due to
the failure of the President to consult with the Senators from Oklahoma, in

29

Id.
E-mail from Susanna Byrne, Admin. Office of the United States Courts, to Daniel
J. Knudsen (Apr. 18, 2011) (on file with author).
31
See, e.g., RUSSELL WHEELER & SARAH BINDER, BROOKINGS INST., DO JUDICIAL
EMERGENCIES MATTER? NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION DELAY DURING THE 111TH
CONGRESS 1, 4–5 (2011) (“Overall, only 35 percent of district vacancies were filled in the
last Congress, with little priority apparently given to filling the most overburdened vacant
judgeships.”).
32
See Lithwick, Empty Chambers, supra note 11; Litchwick, Courthouse Is Closed,
supra note 11 (“[T]he federal justice system is in deep and worsening trouble.”); infra note
39 and accompanying text.
33
Bruce Moyer, Vacancy Signs at the Federal Courthouse, 57 FED. LAW. 8, 8 (2010).
34
Id. (pointing to senatorial procedures as “secret holds” and the use of the filibuster
to obstruct judicial confirmations to explain the drop in confirmations).
35
ALICIA BANNON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCIES: THE TRIAL COURTS 1 (2013)
(“District courts typically see brief peaks in vacancies after a presidential election,
followed by a sharp decline in subsequent years. Yet, during the Obama administration,
after district court vacancies spiked in 2009 they never returned to their previous level and,
in fact, have grown further. For the first time since 1992, the average number of district
court vacancies has been greater than 60 for five straight years, from 2009–2013.”
(emphasis omitted)).
30
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particular Senator Coburn. 36 There are many other examples reflecting a general
trend toward obstruction under President Obama. 37 Clearly, a crucial dimension to
the current vacancy problem is the judicial nominations problem. Analyzing the
dynamics of judicial nominations has received some scholarly attention, focused
partly on an institutional-level analysis. 38
Prominent journalists decried these vacancies, and the emergencies that
followed, as unacceptable in a country with a vaunted tradition of rule of law. 39
Policy institutes examined congressional failure to approve judicial nominations,
sounding a cautionary note about political polarization. 40 Scholars have also
criticized the political aspects of the nomination process, calling on the U.S. Senate
to halt its delay of judicial appointments.41 The executive branch itself weighed in:
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder implored that the system “move expeditiously”
to fill the empty judicial seats.42 Many institutional actors view these vacancies as
troublesome.
36

See Andrew Cohen, The Minakken Nomination and the White Man, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 6, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/02/the-mikkan
en-nomination-and-the-white-man/70752/.
37
See generally Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s Judiciary at Midterm, 94
JUDICATURE 262 (2011) (arguing that a defiant and stubborn Republican minority in the
Senate impeded most judicial nominations’ progress).
38
See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 1−5 (2005); PETER C. KESTERHOFF, COURT NOMINATIONS:
ISSUES IN NOMINATIONS AND CONFIRMATION (2009); BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note
23, at 58−78.
39
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Editorial, Calling John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21,
2010, 9:44 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/calling-john-roberts/?_r
=1 (noting the problem of unconfirmed judicial appointments and “look[ing] forward to
waking up on New Year’s Day to this headline or its reasonable equivalent: ‘Senate
Imperils Judicial System, Roberts Says’”); Dahlia Lithwick & Carl Tobias, Vacant Stares,
SLATE (Sept. 27, 2010, 6:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru
dence/2010/09/vacant_stares.html.
40
Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nomination: Into the Home Stretch, BROOKINGS INST.
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0927_judicial_nominations_wh
eeler.aspx (stating a “plausible explanation [for the downturn in the percentage of district
court confirmations] is that political polarization is claiming one more of the unwritten
rules that have traditionally sustained the federal judiciary—routine, bi-partisan approval of
professionally competent district nominees whom both home-state senators endorse”).
41
See, e.g., John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need
for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 183−89 (2004); E. Stewart Moritz,
“Statistical Judo”: The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in the Judicial Appointment Process,
22 J.L. & POL’Y. 341, 344−46, 392−94 (2006); Karl A. Schweitzer, Litigating the
Appointments Clause: The Most Effective Solution for Senate Obstruction of the Judicial
Confirmation Process, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 909, 909−11 (2010).
42
Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 19−20 (2010) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the
United States) (“There are currently 105 vacancies on the federal courts. Yet the Senate has

196

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

Congress has enacted a number of statutes to ensure that efficiency in the
processing of filings and cases is maintained. For example, the Civil Justice
Reform Act, 43 passed in 1990, mandates publication of a list of motions and cases
that are being held up by judges in the district courts, both by magistrate judge and
district judge. 44 The Civil Justice Reform Act tracks motions pending for longer
than six months, cases pending for longer than six months, and bench trials
submitted for decision for over six months. 45 Time-to-disposition is an important
aspect of ensuring the federal judiciary functions correctly, and efficiency is an
important part of procedural justice. However, efficiency without quality does not
ensure justice.
The more interesting variables are those that detail aspects of decision making
other than time. Courts and court processes are also “egalitarian political venues” 46
which provide a “window into the mundane” that allows for both equality before
the law and also for the democratic function of restraining state power.47 This is
close to the same critique made against the rise of alternative dispute resolution by
Professor Owen Fiss, that settlement “as a generic practice” is not to be preferred
to judgment, nor “should [it] be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate
basis.” 48 This critique has been extended to the legalization of private processes
dictated by the courts. 49 Speed and efficiency are not the only measures of an
effectively functioning federal judiciary. The one large institutional shift in the
federal district courts over time has been a shift away from trials. When the federal
rules of civil procedure were adopted, fifteen percent of cases ended with a trial;
some sixty years later, less than three percent did, and these three percent were
viewed as institutional “failures.” 50
On these accounts, a judicial emergency would be a form of institutional
stress that results in fewer full trials, perhaps more motions to dismiss and
settlements, and fewer published opinions. Indeed, published opinions have been
confirmed only 19 federal judges during the 15 months of this administration. That is less
than 34% of the President’s judicial nominees and less than half the number confirmed
during the same time period for Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. I ask that you do
everything possible to move expeditiously to fill the vacancies on our federal courts.”).
43
28 U.S.C §§ 471–82 (2012).
44
Id. § 476.
45
Id.
46
Judith Resnik, Courts In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 807
(2008) (noting Bentham’s phrase that the openness of court processes “keeps the judge
himself, while trying, under trial”).
47
Id. at 804.
48
Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
49
Judith Resnik, Essay, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the
Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 191 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he
legalization of private processes brings with it professional domination and greater
complexity, making these processes mimic adjudication and collapse into it”).
50
Id. at 188–89 (noting that concepts of “right to sue” have been replaced by
“obligations to use alternatives”).
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proposed as one metric of what constitutes the judiciary functioning as a proper
institution. 51 Closely related to publication is the practice of “private judging,” that
is: the unpublication, depublication, or stipulated withdrawal of opinions that result
in these opinions largely disappearing from the public purview. 52
III. STATISTICAL RESULTS
The dataset used in this study is constructed from data collected annually by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. This study uses data from 2006 to
2009. The unit of analysis is district court, not judge. 53 The data was compiled
from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (“ICPSR”)
datasets (Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base) from 2006 to 2009, as well as
data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts website on judicial
vacancies. The dataset has 1504 observations, which are broken down by quarter
year for each district court in the United States. It is important to note, again, that
the unit of analysis is the district court itself, not each individual district-court
judge. The courts range in size from small, at one to three authorized judgeships, to
large, at up to twenty-eight authorized judgeships. There are ninety-four district
courts in the study. Twenty-two courts, or 23% of courts in the study, never had a
judicial emergency declared. By contrast, seventy-two courts, or 77% of the courts
in the study experienced at least one period of judicial emergency over the study
period, 2006 to 2009. Thirty-three of the district courts entered emergency status
during the study period. Thirty-five district courts, by contrast, left emergency
status during this period. Lastly, nineteen of the district courts experienced
multiple periods of judicial emergency, entering, exiting, and entering again.
There are three dependent variables for analysis that come from the ICPSR
dataset: (i) a variable called pretrial, that is, the number of cases that are disposed
of on motions before trial, and its ratio relative to the number of filings in the given
quarter year; (ii) a variable called state remands, that is, the count of the number of
cases that are remanded to a state court and its ratio; and (iii) a variable called
federal agency, that is, a count of the number of cases that are remanded to an
agency. The variable pretrial will be the focus of this Article, as it relates to a

51

See generally Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private
Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1436−40 (2004) (exploring the history,
procedures, and negative consequences of unpublished judicial opinions, noting that such
practices give judges, clerks, attorneys, and bureaucrats the “power to declare judicial
decisions of little or no precedential value and in some cases either to make them disappear
from the public record or to abort them”).
52
Id. at 1436−38. (“The apparently peculiar U.S. doctrine of precedent was created by
the scandalous practices of private judging . . . : ‘unpublishing,’ ‘depublishing,’ and
withdrawing judicial opinions.”).
53
Finer-grained data on judges would make for a more detailed study of individual
decision making.

198

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

number of institutional and legal questions concerning the district courts and
adjudicative processes detailed in Section IV.
This Article looks at six different kinds of judicial emergencies, coded as
binary indicator variables. These emergencies are categorized by both their place
of occurrence—district court or court of appeals—and their manner of
occurrence—time emergencies, defined by months of vacant judgeships, or filings
emergencies, defined by raw filings data. Time emergencies involve courts that
have over a certain number of filings and eighteen months of a vacant judgeship.
In the district courts, the number of filings that triggers the time emergency in the
given month-year is 430. In the circuit courts, that number rises to 500. By
contrast, a filings emergency occurs based on pure filings alone; a district court is
in filings emergency if it has over 600 filings and a circuit court is in filings
emergency if it has over 700 filings. The last two emergency variables are simply
combinations of these measures for the two types of courts: if a court had either
type of emergency in the given quarter year.
Lastly, to disaggregate the sample and examine trends based on court size,
this Article has included a measure of the district courts’ size based on number of
judgeships. Small courts are those with fewer than ten authorized judgeships.
Large courts are those with ten or more authorized judgeships.
The summary statistics for these variables are presented in the table below.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max

Circuit

1504

6.521277

3.035312

0

11

District

1504

47.70213

27.92513

0

96

Case

1504

672.0047

1007.801

2

17317

State

1504

11.78125

16.02628

0

157

Agency

1504

14.91689

27.93849

0

449

Pretrial

1504

81.49601

83.65185

0

748

State Ratio

1504

0.022201

0.022099

0

0.229050

Agency Ratio

1504

0.022084

0.024714

0

0.481481

Pretrial Ratio

1504

0.148778

0.099651

0

0.563106

District Emerg.

1504

0.084441

0.278141

0

1

Circuit Emerg.

1504

0.499335

0.500165

0

1

District Time
Emerg.

1504

0.041888

0.200400

0

1

DFE

1504

0.042553

0.201914

0

1

CTE

1504

0.323803

0.468081

0

1

CFE

1504

0.175531

0.380548

0

1

Filings

1504

3692.37

4736.458

64

48988.67

Judgeships

1504

7.212766

5.626422

1

28

Linear

1504

8.5

4.611305

1

16

Small Courts

1504

0.744680

0.436185

0

1

Large Courts

1504

0.255319

0.436185

0

1

A natural set of figures to examine is the average of case outcomes, such as
pretrial dismissals or remands to state courts, over a period of time. Such a basic
outcome comparison cannot by itself meaningfully answer questions related to the
effect of the declared emergencies given the many confounding variables, for
which the analysis does not control. But it provides the starting point for a more indepth examination of the variables of interest. Tables 2 and 3 below provide a
snapshot of the difference in means for the two types of emergencies. These tables
show the difference in the means of each variable conditional on the indicator
variable of emergencies.
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Table 2: Comparisons Across District Emergencies
Variable
Pretrial Dispositions
Pretrial Dispositions (Ratio)
State Court Remands
State Court Remands (Ratio)
Federal Agency Remands
Federal Agency Remands (Ratio)

District Emergency?

Mean

No

77.65214

Yes

123.1732

No

0.1510701

Yes

0.1239364

No

10.82789

Yes

22.11811

No

0.0223948

Yes

0.0201058

No

13.51198

Yes

30.14961

No

0.0219398

Yes

0.023657

Table 3: Comparisons Across Circuit Emergencies
Variable
Pretrial Dispositions

Pretrial Dispositions (Ratio)

State Court Remands

State Court Remands (Ratio)

Federal Agency Remands

Federal Agency Remands (Ratio)

Circuit Emergency?

Mean

No

67.70252

Yes

95.32623

No

0.1478736

Yes

0.1496866

No

9.398406

Yes

14.17044

No

0.0207019

Yes

0.0237051

No

11.79947

Yes

18.04261

No

0.0201704

Yes

0.0240043
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Stark differences between emergency and non-emergency comparisons
provide an illustration of the limits of pure comparative analysis. The natural
pattern, which yields large differences between the raw numbers of pretrial
dismissals, state court remands, and agency remands, and small differences
between the ratios, is that large courts will be more likely to be in emergency
groups because they have more judgeships that are possibly vacant. Moreover,
these large courts likely have more aggregate filings, driving the number of, for
example, pretrial dismissals even higher. These data dynamics highlight the need
to control for various differences between the emergency and nonemergency
groups to be able to untangle the effects of emergency status as separate and apart
from the effects of those other differences. The most rigorous means of doing this
is a fixed-effects regression analysis, which examines changes in pretrial numbers
and ratios within a given court as it moves to or from emergency status. Such an
analysis is offered in the Appendix. A more transparent and simple approach—
informed by the regression analysis and yielding results matching those in the
Appendix—is to look at mean comparisons for subgroups of district courts that are
at least somewhat comparable to one another. Table 4 reflects such an approach. In
this table, district courts are categorized as “small” and “large” and the most robust
effect from the regression analysis, the effect of circuit court filings emergencies,
is highlighted.

[NO. 1
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Sample
All District
Courts
Small District
Courts
(Judgeships <
10)
Large District
Courts
(Judgeships ≥
10)

Standard Error

0.154920

95% Confidence Interval

384

1120

1504

Courts*

Table 4: Difference In Means In Pretrial Ratio For Circuit Time Emergencies
Mean

0.1426628

0.157621

0.0031244

0.1398836

0.1487915

0.0045213

Circuit
Emergency?
No
0.1487524

0.140163

Yes

0.123819

0.123337

0.165594
0.0041652

0.1102126

0.204911

0.150492

0.1319914

0.0033378

0.1637205

0.0038486

Yes

0.1167752

0.0104748

0.1580434

No

0.1843158

No

Yes

*Courts are the unit of observation

Filings
625989

384706

276107

133651

349882

251055
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For these large courts, more geographically concentrated between districts
and circuits (i.e., the many judges—both district and circuit—who work in the
same court building), there is a 7% difference in the number of cases disposed of
on pretrial motions while under emergency.
These results are confirmed by the regression output, reported in the
Appendix. Table A1 presents the results of regressions using a balanced districtcourt fixed-effects panel. The variables for district-court judicial emergencies are
never statistically significant on the three independent variables: pretrial
dismissals, remands to state courts, or remands to agencies. Statistically, the
impacts of institutional stress are weaker as a direct effect on district-court rulings.
However, the impacts of institutional stress to federal circuit courts, vertically
related to the federal district courts, are statistically significant. Judicial
emergencies in the federal circuit courts are statistically significant for both the
pretrial-dismissal and remand-to-state-court variables, with a more robust effect in
the former. This regression result suggests that federal district-court judges are
more likely to dispose of cases on pretrial motions if there is a judicial emergency
in their corresponding circuit court. Moreover, this effect is present when analysis
controls for raw number of filings. This suggests that it is not only Huang’s timepressure vector that is changing the behavior of judicial actors under institutional
stress. 54 Less of a pattern emerges with respect to the state-court-remand or
agency-remand variables.
The difference in means, the regression analysis, and the graphical
frameworks suggest that district-court judges act increasingly as gatekeepers under
institutional stress. That is, they might be protecting their colleagues on the federal
circuit courts from the overwhelming amounts of cases that could go up on appeal
with more developed records. They also could be signaling their own stress, or,
focusing on the “big” cases to the detriment of the mundane cases.55 Alternatively,
institutional stress may be generating a “workhorse” mentality for the judges. They
may be trying to clear their own dockets knowing that their circuit in general is
under stress. For one possible theory of these effects, this Article will briefly turn
to an examination of the federal judiciary as an institution.
IV. STRESS, INSTITUTIONS, AND LEGAL THEORY
A. The Institution of the Federal District Courts
Congress established the federal district courts pursuant to the U.S
Constitution Article III, Section 1, granting a power to create “such inferior Courts

54

Huang, supra note 15, at 1118 (“[A] rise in time pressure might make time-saving
options more attractive.”).
55
See Judith Resnik, Wither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1101, 1149
(2006).
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as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 56 The federal district
courts are essentially trial courts, and federal district-court judges understand
themselves as presiding over a trial-type institution. One current issue for the
federal district courts is the erosion of this traditional role as a forum for trials.
Recently these vaunted courtrooms have “gone dark”: the average federal district
judge goes nearly 300 days of the year with no trials. 57 Concern over this trend is
motivated both by the expressive importance of trials and the federal district
courts’ role in protecting litigants’ constitutional rights.58 Connected to this is a
perceived danger of the trial courts turning into administrative agencies: becoming
“indistinguishable from state highway departments.” 59 Federal district courts
exhibit a two-fold institutional character: they conduct trials, and they also
vindicate fundamental rights, often but not necessarily through the formal process
of adjudication.
Another institutional characteristic of the federal district courts is their
contested institutional identity as lawmaking institutions. In one survey, over 40%
of federal district judges thought of themselves as “policy-makers”; but 52% did
not. 60 Federal district judges do not see themselves as making much “public
policy,” or “making the law”:
On occasion, either way the law is interpreted it will have the effect of
making law, trial judges should not attempt to make the law.61
I don’t believe in judicial activism—changing the law because Congress
has failed to do [so]. 62
Even the district-court judges that agreed with the idea that judges make
policy did so with reservations:
Occasionally they do—it is inevitable. 63
Where there is no binding precedent. 64
To understand the federal judiciary and the district courts’ institutional
characteristics first requires an understanding of what is meant by “institution.”
56

U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1.
Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 746.
58
See id. at 762.
59
Id.
60
KEVIN L. LYLES, THE GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 20 (1997).
61
Id.at 23.
62
Id. at 22–23.
63
Id. at 23.
64
Id.
57
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Institutions are prominent in economics literature, and the analysis of institutions
has a long historical pedigree, both in economics and also in law. 65 Some scholars
focus on institutions both in their rule- and norm-creating aspects and also on their
role of providing expectations and stability to structure coordination. 66 For
example, through signaling, the federal district courts structure coordination
amongst the judicial hierarchy, both to the circuit courts above and also to the
magistrates below. The other aspect of work on institutions focuses on both formal
rules, like statutory law or contracts, as well as informal rules, such as social
norms. 67 However, this strain of scholarship focuses mostly on institutions as
external constraints, or “rules of the game.” 68 This literature defines a separate
category—organizations embodying political bodies—like the Senate, local city
councils, or the judiciary. 69 These organizations and their structure emerge then as
functions of the institutional framework. 70
Moreover, individuals can be seen as institutions; or more appropriately put,
individuals work within institutions which represent “the conventions, norms and
formally sanctioned rules of a society.” 71 If the ends of behavior are only focused
on maximization of individual utility, then “institutions can only take the form of
external rules or constraints.” 72 However, a broadening perspective that takes
behavior as “socially contingent” also generates “an understanding . . . of
institutions as forming the individual” and this understanding becomes “not only
possible[, it] is necessary.” 73 It is also worth noting that within the frameworks of
65

The early focus on institutional economics arose out of transaction costs and
focused on legal rules to solve these problems. Later institutional work focused more on
soft norms, culture, and social capital within institutions.
66
See Arild Vatn, Institutions and Rationality, in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 113, 115 (2008) (“We are . . . living in a world
where our actions as individuals are interdependent. Hence, what one person does
influences other people’s opportunities. Certainly, if we were able to construct norms
telling us how to take other people’s interests into account in specific situations, many
conflicts could be avoided. Moreover, if these rules [were] built on common values, it
would be easier to coordinate action. Such a process could even have the capacity to
harmonize interests. Hence, norms can be seen as supporting common values.” (citation
omitted)). The idea that norms, arising from institutions, support common values is key to
understanding the judiciary.
67
See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3–6 (1990).
68
See id. at 4–5 (“They are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a
competitive team sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as well as typically
unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules, such as not
deliberately injuring a key player on the opposing team.”).
69
See id. at 5.
70
Id.
71
Vatn, supra note 66, at 114.
72
Id. at 115.
73
Id.
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norms and rules—the institutional setting—different types of rationality are at
work. For example, individuals in an institutional setting promote trust, one of the
values of a tightly knit institutional structure. 74 Other research focuses on
institutions as simply “common knowledge at equilibrium,” implying that
institutional stress could upset this equilibrium and cause many unintended
consequences. 75 Institutions also have certain “scripts,” exhibiting, among other
things, overlap costs representing scripts that are embedded in organizational
structure. 76
The federal judiciary operates within this institutional framework as well. The
judiciary is an institution, the same as an administrative agency, a local city
council, a firm, or the Senate. A principle of public choice theory and institutional
economics is that the institutional structure, and not necessarily the intent or ability
of the individual decision maker, can incent and drive a pattern of economically
inefficient or normatively undesirable decisions. 77 Institutional norms and
structures in a given courthouse may also drive decision making. The list of
institutional norms here is long: informal norms of behavior; circuit effects on the
toleration of dissent; circuit size as a measure of how frequently colleagues serve
with one another on panels; and the individual caseloads of the judges, which
might matter for how much “time judges have to articulate disagreement with their
peers.” 78 Greater uncertainty with regards to information about the social rules
governing interactions is a function of size, and this both decreases reliance on
informal rules and makes them more susceptible to shocks. 79
Judicial institutional norms have been examined before, at all levels of the
federal judicial hierarchy. The Supreme Court remains the most studied court, and
one that most people posit as deeply political. Some argue that dissents and

74

See EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 309 (2005).
75
See Masahiko Aoki, Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Changes, 3 J.
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1, 3 (2007).
76
See Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete
Institutionalism, 98 GEORGETOWN L.J. 863, 871 (2010).
77
Public choice theory makes this point in a way more akin to those in the legislative
branch, but it could apply equally well to judges. See Edward J. Lopez, An Introduction to
The Pursuit of Justice, in THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 1, 4 (Edward J. Lopez ed., 2010) (“The institutional structure, not the bad
politician, is the root cause of economically inefficient policies such as pork barrel
spending. Thus, in order to achieve fewer bad policies, public choice analysis would
suggest institutional change—divorcing representation from geography, for example.”).
78
VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 38–40 (2006).
79
JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 176 (1992) (“Socially shared
knowledge is mainly a product of shared experience: As the number of actors increases, the
likelihood that a person will have ongoing interactions with the same actors declines. The
effect here is to decrease reliance on informal rules to establish expectations.”).
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concurrences on the Supreme Court are shaped by informal consensual norms. 80
Others have found that the agenda-setting process—the policy-making function of
the Court—is also shaped by informal and institutional norms. 81 Scholars have also
made the argument that the political nature of the Supreme Court is overstated.82
However, with the small number of cases that the Court takes, as well as these
cases’ presumed legal difficulty, it is not surprising that judgments on the Court
shade toward overt political choices, or at least appear to do so.
Scholars have also studied the federal circuit courts. In studying the norms of
the federal circuit courts, the two most prominent areas of focus are panel effects,
in which the votes of judges are influenced by their colleagues on the panel,83 and
the elevation of federal district-court judges to the appellate bench. However,
related to institutional norms, only recently have scholars examined the reasons
that panel effects arise in the first place. Two mechanisms have been proposed to
explain the existence of panel effects: deliberative and strategic explanations.84
Deliberative explanations are those that occur because of “dynamics internal to the
members of a panel” and can encompass persuasion through reasoned argument,
the exchange of information, or conformity or group pressures. 85 By contrast,
strategic explanations are those that occur by taking into consideration likely
responses by other actors. 86 In the case of the federal courts of appeals the
“preferences of the Supreme Court” and the “circuit as a whole” are taken into
consideration rather than just the three judge panel. 87 Ultimately, this examination

80

Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in
the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874, 900 (1998) (“[W]e demonstrate that the
patterns of dissents and concurrences on the Court for the past two centuries are consistent
with the existence of ‘consensual norms’ which, to varying degrees over time, have
restrained the justices from engaging in overt conflict.”).
81
See Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG: An
Empirical and Institutional Analysis with Michael E. Solimine, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1421,
1440.
82
Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—And the Nation’s, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 6–8 (2006).
83
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 9 (2007)
(“This collegiality effect appears to be at least as powerful as the individual judge’s own
preferences.”). A series of studies have explained panel effects. Richard Revesz’s study on
environmental cases in the D.C. Circuit found that a colleague’s ideology was a better
predictor of a vote than the judge’s own ideology. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717–19 (1997).
Subsequent studies also verified the presence of panel effects. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 22.
84
Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1324–27 (2009).
85
Id. at 1325.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1326.
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finds that the strategic considerations matter more than the internal dynamics. 88
This division, between strategic and internal dynamics, forms the penumbra of a
theory of embedded judging. But these studies are nowhere extended to the federal
district courts.
In the federal courts of appeals several institutional roles could also shape the
opinions of judges and case outcomes. Chief judges in a position of “institutional
authority” would be more wary of dissenting opinions, which differ over outcome,
as a threat to “collegial relations among judges” than they would be of concurring
opinions, which differ over legal reasoning only. 89 Moreover, younger judges or
federal district-court judges elevated to serve on appellate panels may be less likely
to dissent or concur. 90
In viewing the judiciary as an institution, from the Supreme Court to the
federal courts of appeals to the federal district courts, a key aspect becomes
institutional stability. Assuming arguendo formal rules as well as informal rules
and norms combine to compose an institutional equilibrium, then exogenous
shocks to institutions can realign or alter these fundamental equillibria.
Institutional change is the obverse of institutional stability, and institutional stress
orthogonal to both of these.
Institutional stress, especially prolonged institutional stress of the kind
signified by a judicial emergency, could interfere in important ways with these
interactions. For one thing, this current round of judicial emergencies has
extended, for the first time, to the federal district courts. In this sense, current
judicial emergencies have upset not only the horizontal institutional equilibrium
but also the vertical equilibrium. Horizontal institutional equilibrium is probably
put to the test here. Judges on the federal circuit courts are likely aware that the
federal district courts are also suffering from vacancy problems.
In short, under institutional distortions or stresses, informal rules proliferate
and alter or replace more formal decision-making structures. 91 This could have an
impact on institutional actors’ decision-making processes and their effective
identity within the court system. A prima facie assumption in this analysis then
becomes that individuals are not free of the constraints of their social and
institutional settings when making decisions. This seems at once uncontroversial
and controversial. The claim that social institutions affect decision making is
uncontroversial because the counterfactual is nearly impossible to imagine:
88

Id. at 1375 (“Both minority and majority judges on ideologically mixed panels
differ in their willingness to vote counter-ideologically, depending upon how the circuit as
a whole is aligned relative to the panel members. These results are consistent with the
theory that circuit judges behave strategically with an eye to circuit en banc review.”).
89
HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 78, at 38.
90
Id.
91
See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 74, at 28–30 (“For formal institutions (socalled made orders) key questions are: what set of informal rules will grow into the gaps in
the formal institutional framework and how long will the spontaneous growth process
continue?”).
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everyone is embedded within a set of social structures, both subtle and powerful,
and an individual makes many decisions in the context of these structures. The
claim that social institutions affect decision making is controversial because
individuals often resist the notion that their decisions are in any way shaped by
institutions we occupy.
B. Federal District Judges as “Embedded”
Though not a central focus of this research, this Article also demonstrates the
incompleteness of judicial decision-making literature. Much of this literature either
analyzes judges as political decision makers or, in the case of panel effects, as
psychological decision makers who are affected by their colleagues. However, this
Article also highlights the idea that judges decide as embedded individuals. That is,
any attempt to isolate judges as purely atomistic decision makers fails to take into
account an important determinant of their decision making. To take just one
example, on the Supreme Court, perhaps the most political court in the country,
there is a surprisingly complex camaraderie, and the institution itself likely shapes
and alters the justices’ own perceptions and exercise of choice. 92 Federal circuit
courts and federal district courts display this institutional character as well. 93
On this theoretical view, judges are “embedded” actors in both their
respective circuits and in the judiciary as a whole. 94 This embeddedness affects
how the judges may make decisions, and institutional stress could alter this
embeddedness in a variety of ways. 95 In thinking about the judiciary as a social
92

Consider the numerous stories of Justice Brennan’s influence on voting. See
generally HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR (1995).
Consider also the recent health-care case, where Chief Justice Roberts is posited by many
to be voting not purely on political lines but also with an important focus on the
institutional character of the Supreme Court. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: It Is
Kennedy’s Call (FINAL UPDATE 3:14 pm), SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 27, 2012, 5:41 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/argument-recap-it-is-kennedys-call/ (noting that Chief
Justice Roberts might find “institutional imperatives for going along if a majority were
formed to uphold [the Affordable Care Act]”).
93
For example, the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, to pick just two, have
vastly different institutional characters.
94
See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 595–600 (2000) (defining four levels of institutional
economics).
95
For example, Professor David Dequech articulated the following influences on
institutions:
At least three types of influence can be identified. The first, which may be
called the restrictive function of institutions, consists in their role as constraints
on economic behavior. This is the type of influence emphasized by neoclassical
economists and many new institutional economists. I therefore agree with
DiMaggio’s description of most economists as being among those who prefer to
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institution, it is helpful to think about the different interactions in the judiciary
along which institutional and individual preferences can shape one another.
Briefly, there are three ways to organize and understand embeddedness: horizontal
embeddedness, vertical embeddedness, and chronological embeddedness.
These three interactive categories constitute a nascent framework for linking
the literature on institutional stress with the literature on judicial decision making.
The first interactive category might be horizontal, that is, connections that form
between colleagues inside the institution itself. This is best exemplified by the
concept and study of panel effects. 96 Another example of this relationship might be
collegiality; for example, some have argued for splitting the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals because the large number of active judgeships—twenty-eight—
discourages the judges from making good faith efforts to deliberate with each other
to reach outcomes. 97 The second interactive category might be vertical, that is,
salient relationships with other institutions that are directly above or below one’s
own. In the context of the judiciary, it might be the case that there are important
formal, informal, political, and procedural relationships between the various
“inferior” courts established by Congress. For example, the relationship between
the traditionally liberal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court has
been detailed as particularly contentious, yet no doubt permeated by informal

stress how culture, in its regulatory forms, constrains behavior. The second type
of influence refers to the cognitive function of institutions, which is related to
the (strictly) cognitive aspects of culture. The cognitive function refers, first, to
the information that institutions provide to the individual, including the
indication of the likely action of other people. I call this the informationalcognitive function of institutions. Second, the cognitive function of institutions
includes also their influence on the very perception that people have of reality,
that is, on the on the way people select, organize, and interpret information. I
call this their deeper cognitive function. Institutions perform a third function
through their influence on the ends that people pursue. For want of a better term,
this can be called their motivational, or teleological, function. This function is
related to the valuative aspect of culture and to the identification of culture as
providing values. I would now like to explicitly add a fourth function, through
which institutions influence the emotions guiding economic behavior. This
emotional function is related to the expressive, or affective, aspects of culture.
David Dequech, Cognitive and Cultural Embeddedness: Combining Institutional
Economics and Economic Sociology, 37 J. ECON. ISSUES 461, 463–64 (2003) (emphasis
omitted) (citations omitted).
96
Panel effects are defined as the “votes of judges [being] significantly influenced by
the party affiliation of the president who appointed the other two judges on the panel.”
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 22.
97
E.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and
Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV.
659, 660 (2007).
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expectations on both sides. 98 Verticality can also be permanent or temporary.
When a federal district-court judge is temporarily elevated to a seat on the federal
circuit court, they sit with circuit judges. Federal district-court judges are elevated
in this way, in part, on a rationale of encouraging “orientation to the circuit.” 99
Each circuit, it would seem, has its own institutional character. These types of
relationships also exist between courts and agencies, especially in repetitive
situations. For example, the EPA might have a particularly important relationship
with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in which it litigates a majority of its cases.
The elevation of district-court judges explicitly authorized to sit on appellate
benches embodies this horizontal interaction, quite literally, in its movement. The
third interactive category might be chronological: Not only are judges embedded
in space but they are also embedded in time. Institutions have memories and
inertias and judges judge in these chronological spaces as well.
These interactive categories, perhaps, inform a different kind of institution
that lies between two well-established categories. Currently, some economists
distinguish between economic and political institutions. 100 Economic institutions
are categorized as “those that really shape the economic incentives” and “create
opportunities or incentives for investment and innovation.” 101 Economic
institutions “are crucially related to how level the playing field is,” and this
leveling is often informed by “property rights and contracting institutions . . . .” 102
By contrast, political institutions control the “specific distribution of political
power in society.” 103 These two categories are of course interactive, and this
interaction requires thinking about “economic institutions situated in the context of
the political institutions and in particular of the political institutions that support
and make these economic institutions durable.” 104
To these two institutional types might be added legal institutions. Legal
institutions are those that embed individual decision makers into a complicated
series of mutable constraints: chronological, interpersonal, and doctrinal. Legal
98

The Ninth Circuit makes up the overwhelming number of cases considered in the
Supreme Court. SCOTUSBLOG, END-OF-TERM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS—OCTOBER TERM
2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/SB
_Summary_Memo_OT10.pdf (“The Court once again considered more cases from the
Ninth Circuit than it did from any other court—26 of 82 cases (32%).”).
99
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 10, at 573 (noting a tendency also to encourage
district court judges to serve on an appellate panel “within six months to a year of their
appointment”).
100
Daron Acemoglu, The World Through Institutional Lenses, Conversations, EDGE
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://edge.org/conversation/the-world-through-institutional-lenses (noting a
broad definition of institutions as “the set of humanly designed constraints that shape
human behavior” and outlining efforts of two scholars to add “clarity and discipline” to the
concept by distinguishing “between economic and political institution”).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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institutions thus make political institutions durable, and may also facilitate the
legalization and stability of economic institutions. As this Article has shown, stress
to legal institutions along these three dimensions, and perhaps others, can have an
important systematic effect on outcomes. The aspects distinguishing legal
institutions from political and economic institutions, while gestured at in much
institutional research, deserve far greater treatment by legal academics and social
scientists.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has posited that institutional stress, here measured by a court
being in judicial emergency, has an effect on individual decision making,
measured as case outcomes. In particular, the results of a fixed-effects regression
analysis indicate that judicial emergencies in the federal circuit courts have a
statistically robust effect on judicial decision making in the federal district courts.
In particular, an emergency in its corresponding federal circuit court makes it
statistically more likely that cases will be disposed of through pretrial motions in
federal district court. A simple difference in means approach confirms this result,
and suggests that this effect is actually occurring robustly in larger district courts.
The size of the district courts thus affected suggests that important institutional
relationships are in play.
This Article points to further fruitful directions for research. A more unique
question in the context of the federal district courts would be the extent to which
institutional stress affects the more prosaic decisions in the course of a trial: rulings
on evidentiary motions, discovery, and similar outcome-steering choices. Another
question is whether institutional stress holds true for administrative agencies, both
in adjudication and in informal rule making. The bright-line rule for judicial
emergencies suggests that a regression discontinuity design could serve as a
potential fertile area of research. Lastly, a study that would layer judges within
courts, and statistically investigate relevant characteristics of each, would be
interesting and valuable.
Theoretically, this finding suggests that traditional theories of judicial
decision making that focus on individual psychology, 105 individual political

105

The work of Professor Jeffrey J. Rachlinski is indicative of this approach. See
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195–97 (2009) (finding that in criminal cases “judges harbor the
same kinds of implicit biases as others; that these biases can influence their judgment; but
that given sufficient motivation, judges can compensate for the influence of these biases”);
see also Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1251, 1258–60 (2005) (using an experiment to prove that judges often cannot ignore
inadmissible information outside the record).
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disposition, 106 or judicial utility 107 should be augmented and refined by an
emerging literature considering individual decision making in the context of
institutional or social norms. 108 Judges are often viewed simultaneously as
individuals with political and moral preferences as well as individuals necessarily
insulated from public opinion and cloaked with institutional majesty in order to
dispense justice and uphold the rule of law. Though a judge’s decisions may be
tied to political pressures, the overabundance of study of the Supreme Court may
skew the perception of judges as political decision makers. Certainly, the justices
on the Supreme Court decide difficult legal questions that may only have political
answers dependent on highly contested versions of the public good. However,
from the perspective of the federal judiciary, lower federal courts are equally
important: they are the federal trial courts and record shapers. This research
suggests that judges in district courts may operate in a different manner than those
on the Supreme Court. In short, a model of decision making for the district courts
derived from individualistic decision making models and shorn of vertical
institutional context fails to capture the complex reality of lower court judicial
decision making.

106

This frame for analyzing judicial decision making has a long pedigree. See, e.g.,
Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
843, 843–46 (1961) (exploring “empirical relationships between [political party affiliation]
and fifteen areas of judicial decision-making”). For more modern work in this area, see
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 19–22 (finding “strong evidence” of ideological voting
based on partisan affiliation of appointing president).
107
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 135–36 (1995) (providing a
formal model for judicial utility); Resnik, supra note 55, at 1149 (noting that the “‘big’
case” becoming the “centerpiece of adjudication” means that “many life-tenured judges
[become] restless with the ordinariness of other cases and [become] reluctant to invest time
and resources in them.”).
108
See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social
Network Analysis of the Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 504 (2010) (“Our
emphasis on judicial ‘peer effects’ is an attempt to fill the void in these respective theories,
arguing the existing social structure of the hierarchical federal judiciary in part explains
how an existing set of individual micro-motives map to the aggregate macro-behavioral
judicial outcomes.”).
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APPENDIX — REGRESSIONS
For Tables A1 and Tables A2 below I specify the following two general
regressions:
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

i indexes the district court and t indexes quarter-year. There are three
dependent variables Yit: Pretrial, State, and Agency. The variable Pretrial is a count
of the number of cases that are disposed of on motions before trial. The variable
State is a count of the number of cases that are remanded to a state court. The
variable Agency is a count of the number of cases that are remanded to an agency.
Only Pretrial is reported in the following tables, though the estimates for the others
are available upon request. 109
There are six independent variables: district and circuit emergencies, and
disaggregated district and circuit time and filings emergencies. District Time
Emergencies, DTE, is an indicator variable which takes a value of one for those
district courts that are in an emergency in the given month and year because they
have over 430 filings and a judicial vacancy of over eighteen months. District
Filing Emergencies, DFE, is an indicator variable which takes a value of one for
those district courts that are in emergency because they have over 600 weighted
filings per judgeship. The variables labeled “Circuit”, CTE and CFE, have the
same structure as their district-court analogues; the time variable takes a value of
one for those Courts of Appeals in the relevant Circuits that are in emergency in
the given month and year because they have over 500 adjusted filings and a
judicial vacancy of over eighteen months. The filings variable, CFE, takes a value
of one for those Courts of Appeals in the relevant Circuits that have over 700
filings. The variables DEit and CEit take a value of one if the federal district
(circuit) court is in either a time or filings emergency at the start of the given
quarter-year.
There are three control variables: raw filings, a linear control that starts at one
and increases by one for each district court in each subsequent month and year, and
a district court (or circuit court) fixed effect, αi. Filings is simply the aggregate
number of filings each court received in a given month and year and attempts to
control for more active and flooded courts. The variable Linear is employed to
assure that the trends are not simply associated with the time period they occur in;
i.e., filings are not uniformly increasing over the relevant period of study.
109

Note that these regression tables do not report the regressions for the remand to
state courts or to federal agencies. These tables showed less significance in general, but are
available upon request.
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Following Professor Bert Huang, I will use the court as the primary unit of
analysis. 110 There is little extant literature examining the district courts as
institutions, and few studies point the way to controls. Here I have followed
closely Bert Huang’s Lightened Scrutiny. I examine only civil cases and exclude
habeas and prisoner suits, and below I run the regressions with fixed effects for the
federal district courts. 111 Parallel to Professors Binder and Maltzman, I have added
a control for the size of each court’s docket by adding the number of cases filed. 112

110

See Huang, supra note 15, at 1116.
Id. at 1147.
112
See BINDER & MALTZMANN, supra note 23, at 133.
111
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Table A1: District Court Fixed-Effects Regressions
Independent
Variables

Pretrial
Ratio

Pretrial
Ratio

District Time
Emergency

-0.0115

-0.0115

-0.0081

-0.0081

District Filing
Emergency

-0.00344

-0.00343

-0.00703

-0.00703

Circuit Time
Emergency

0.00867

0.00884

-0.00625

-0.00633

0.0192***

0.0192***

-0.00417

-0.00417

District Emergency

Circuit Emergency

Pretrial
Ratio

Pretrial Ratio

-0.00615

-0.00615

-0.00556

-0.00556

0.0169***

0.0170***

-0.00394

-0.00395

Circuit Filings
Emergency
Linear

-0.000367

-0.000355

-0.000295

-0.000291

-0.00027

-0.000271

-0.000273

-0.000274

Filings

-4.88E-07

-1.95E-07

-1.11E-06

-1.13E-06

0.144***

0.146***

0.144***

0.145***

-0.00332

-0.00502

-0.00333

-0.00504

Observations

1504

1504

1504

1504

R-squared

0.016

0.016

0.019

0.019

94

94

94

94

Constant

Number of Districts

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A2: Circuit Court Fixed-Effects Regressions
Independent
Variables

Pretrial
Ratio

Pretrial
Ratio

District Time
Emergency

0.00713

0.0089

-0.0122

-0.0122

District Filing
Emergency

-0.0373***

-0.0337***

-0.0121

-0.0122

Circuit Time
Emergency

0.0113

0.0129

-0.0119

-0.0119

0.0286***

0.0293***

-0.00762

-0.00762

District Emergency

Circuit Emergency

Pretrial
Ratio

Pretrial
Ratio

-0.0144

-0.0114

-0.00884

-0.00895

0.0249***

0.0259***

-0.00723

-0.00724

Circuit Filings
Emergency
Linear

-0.00037

-0.000343

-0.000451

-0.000424

-0.000517

-0.000516

-0.000521

-0.000521

Filings

-1.13e-06**

-1.01e-06*

-5.47E-07

-5.48E-07

0.141***

0.144***

0.143***

0.145***

-0.00622

-0.0064

-0.00624

-0.00642

Observations

1504

1504

1504

1504

R-squared

0.011

0.013

0.017

0.019

12

12

12

12

Constant

Number of Circuits

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

